How .x3 fits
The owner sets the constraints once in a .x3 mandate: per-payment and 24-hour caps, an approval threshold, recipient and asset allowlists, a refund address and an expiry. The agent can only propose payments; Guard enforces the mandate on NEAR mainnet before any cross-chain payment through NEAR Intents.
The owner's spending mandate
mandate x3_shopping_agent {
owner x3-owner.near
agent x3-agent.near
spend Solana.USDC
per_payment 50000000
per_24h 200000000
allow recipients x3-demo.near
allow assets Near.USDC
refund_to 4Nd1mzi8Y1QYxJt9wZWBYZpG7S4pYkZs6YzD3Vt9aBcD
require slippage <= 1%
require fees <= 100 bps
approve above 30000000 by 1 of x3-owner.near
expires 30d
}Amounts use token base units. These accounts are example or historical testnet identities; use the source guide before adapting a program.
What the evidence establishes
Trust and limits
Reproduce and inspect
Next evidence: Run the same mandate for a real counterparty: a vendor invoice paid from a contract-held budget, with recurring payments and a revenue split under owner-set caps.
Reviewed November 13, 2026 against X3Lang f2a01a2.
Judge walkthrough
- Read the mandate and payment source. Identify recipient, asset, amount, nonce, deadline and refund terms.
- Run the local policy preview. Change the recipient to attacker.near and inspect the refusal; local results do not prove chain execution.
- Open the mainnet invoice_06 bundle and the separately labeled testnet records. Match each contract, transaction and network to its claim. Check that the two published .x3 files hash to the values Guard stores for invoice_06.
- For delivery, inspect the source and destination finalized records and the relay assumptions separately from Guard authorization.