Skip to content

Inspect the Proof

Evidence by source and network.

Compare two completed mainnet payments: the new owner-approved, agent-executed Solana vault pilot and the earlier owner-funded NEAR Guard demonstration. Each proof states what it establishes and what remains unproven.

Provider incident feed

Official NEAR Intents SHIELD, separate from X3 Force Field. An operational response means no active incidents were reported at observation time; it does not certify chain health or authorize a payment.

Not checked. Provider condition is unknown.

Agent-executed vault payment · November 14

Archived mainnet · November 14, 2026Owner-approved · agent-executedSettled · minimum met

Your policy sets the budget. You approve the exact quote. The agent executes the allowed payment from a PDA-owned vault: 5 USDC on Solana → 4.999746 USDC to x3lang.near.

  1. Solana mainnet

    1. Owner approved the quote

    Exactly 5 USDC

    Nonce 1 binds the amount, deposit account, quote digest and expiry. The owner signs this approval.

    Inspect owner approval

  2. Solana mainnet

    2. Agent executed from the vault

    5.000000 USDC

    The dedicated agent signs execution. The policy PDA authorizes the inner SPL token transfer from the vault.

    Inspect agent transfer

  3. NEAR mainnet

    3. USDC delivered on NEAR

    4.999746 USDC

    The finalized token event pays x3lang.near, above the signed 4.974757-USDC minimum. Provider status: SUCCESS.

    Inspect NEAR payout

The policy after settlement

5 USDC per payment and per rolling 24 hours. Nonce 1 consumed. No pending approval. Vault balance: 0 USDC. The archived post-state records one 5-USDC spend.

Read the settlement and policy state

What a judge can try

Edit a payment in the policy checker and inspect its decision locally. Then follow the real mainnet receipts here. These checks require no wallet connection or funds.

Try the policy checker

Proof boundaries and trust assumptions
  • The owner approved this exact quote before the agent executed it. This is one bounded pilot, not unrestricted autonomous spending.
  • The Solana policy PDA enforced this transfer. This pilot adds no new NEAR Guard call; the earlier invoice_06 Guard proof is separate.
  • Finalized source and payout observations used one RPC per chain. Provider SUCCESS links the two legs; cryptographic solver causality and cross-chain atomicity are not proven.
  • The owner retains upgrade authority. No external contract audit or reproducible source-to-SBF build identity is established by this proof.

The generic receipt verifier rejects the differing request/program deadlines. The original receipt is preserved; the archive uses separate vault-commitment, source-event and direct payout checks.

Read the complete proofView offline verifierInspect the signed quote

Historical evidence pinned to X3Lang 9ec3b48. This page does not request a quote, sign a transaction or spend funds.

Earlier NEAR Guard payment · invoice_06

Mainnet · Solana → NEARSigned 1Click quoteNonce mainnet_demo_nov11_invoice_06

The owner wrote the rules in .x3. A restricted agent key got the payment past Guard's 21 checks. The owner funded 25 USDC on Solana, and 24.9952 USDC reached x3lang.near on NEAR.

  1. 1 · Owner approved

    NEAR mainnet

    approve_intent

    x3lang.near approved this intent before any agent call.

    GFdQLrzT…X5fsK6

  2. 2 · Guard accepted

    NEAR mainnet

    21 / 21 checks

    The agent's restricted key accepted the signed 1Click quote. The receipt returns 21 guards, all passing: recipient, asset, caps, refund, slippage, fees, approval, deadline and quote terms.

    Eg75uehw…Agu153

  3. 3 · Deposited

    Solana mainnet

    25.000000 USDC

    The owner signed the deposit to the quoted address from the funding wallet named in the mandate.

    4zhGYyWN…2RkXo5

  4. 4 · Delivered

    NEAR mainnet

    24.995200 USDC

    intents.near paid native USDC to x3lang.near, 84 seconds after the deposit.

    8jfbACLS…XPw43P

  5. 5 · Outcome recorded

    NEAR mainnet

    Settled · floor met

    The restricted agent key recorded the settlement on Guard: 24995200 out, both transaction hashes stored.

    9sTn9pJ1…CCzuqE

Accounts and keys

Guard contract · code hash
x3lang.near · BPdpJAw8…ZFb15T
Agent key that signed (FunctionCall, 3 Guard methods)
x3-agent.x3lang.near · ed25519:J3NiU8…JdP11x
Also on the agent account (FullAccess recovery, unused)
ed25519:8teaXG…68c23u
Funding wallet (Solana)
58tbMfad…zhB3cQ

What this does not prove

  1. The owner manually signed the Solana deposit from the funding wallet. First-party records identify it as the owner's; the chain shows the signer, not who controls it.
  2. Guard does not hold or move the USDC. A holder of the funding wallet's key could pay without Guard.
  3. The agent account still has the owner's FullAccess recovery key next to its restricted key. That key signed none of these calls.
  4. The recorded outcome is the agent's report. Guard stores the supplied transaction hashes and checks the amount against the floor; it does not authenticate the hashes.
  5. The Solana deposit and the NEAR payout are linked by 1Click status, timing and amount, not by a cryptographic cross-chain proof.
  6. Guard checks the stored .x3 hashes; it does not compile or run .x3. X3VM is not on the deployed authorization path.
  7. One settlement of about $25. It does not establish production reliability.

One-page proof card · Link-by-link check · Evidence bundle · Outcome readback · Raw public RPC observation · Observer run · Reviewed November 13, 2026 against X3Lang f2a01a2

CI and local gates

Seven passing checks at the reviewed commit

X3Lang f2a01a2: Rust VM, provenance, Python/browser, compile-time refusals, signed-quote baselines, NEAR Guard and compromised-model refusal checks all passed. This result covers this revision only.

Inspect all checks for this commit

Reviewed source and reproducible walkthrough

Evidence reviewed November 13, 2026. The source revision is pinned so the README, contract and evidence can be inspected together. Local tests prove their tested behavior; they do not fill public-chain or independent-audit milestones.

Open the pinned X3Lang source

Quote verification

NEAR testnet · official 1Click quote · not a deposit

Refusal and acceptance

NEAR testnet · x3lang.testnet · no swap-asset custody

Refused: attacker.near

agent_register_intent failed mandate_recipient. Other guards on that intent passed. The explorer receipt can show only a generic Wasm trap; the reason is in the archived view.

AhVBD7oXfwsixBipupjCzuhNdqunjdXJnLz3LXnmfnN8

Accepted: permitted recipient

Same mandate, recipient x3lang.testnet, intent_registered. The mandate was later observed revoked. Create and revoke themselves are state observations, not separately anchored transactions in that note.

DPJfcRUGk56h8sSsFsDFFgUMQAiyBCtpMuvquF9FvTct

Write-up: near-guard-testnet-live-2026-11-06.md

Settlement

HistoricalBase Sepolia to NEAR testnetTidepool relay · not official 1Click settlement

1.000000 test USDC left Base Sepolia. 0.997400 arrived on NEAR testnet for x3lang.testnet, above min_receive 980000. Program SHA-256 1398f64e7e208d3796883aa59cb169187c1042ac1af3781bd6efc014755df860 was bound on x3guardlaunch2026.testnet in block 276,595,201 before the source transfer. The README says this used a trusted testnet relay. It does not prove atomic settlement, and it is not mainnet.

Mainnet Guard setup

NEAR mainnet Guard deployment and setup are documented for x3lang.near. The archived records cover deployment, storage, scoped agent access, intent registration and owner approval. The later invoice_06 bundle above supplies the acceptance, deposit and payout records; the setup note remains a historical record. Inspect the mainnet setup evidence.

1Click Explorer history

Live 1Click Explorer history is not connected on this site yet. This panel shows the published mainnet and historical testnet evidence instead. Open each link to inspect its archived evidence or public explorer receipt.

  • MAINNET25 USDC Solana → 24.9952 USDC NEAR after a restricted agent key passed 21 Guard checks on the signed 1Click quote. The original .x3 files match the stored hashes; the owner signed the deposit; the agent recorded Settled.invoice_06 evidence
  • REFUSEDAgent intent paying attacker.near stopped by mandate_recipientAhVBD7oX…nmfnN8
  • ALLOWEDSame mandate, permitted recipient: intent_registeredDPJfcRUG…9FvTct
  • SETTLED1.000000 test USDC Base Sepolia → 0.997400 on NEAR, one .x3 program (trusted Tidepool relay)EBEBxJNg…FyCm1d
  • SOURCEHistorical Tidepool testnet source: 1.000000 test USDC sent on Base Sepolia0x46c21dc3…6728d9

The MAINNET row links to the invoice_06 archive; the other rows are historical testnet records. Live Explorer history, once connected, remains provider-reported and does not independently prove chain finality, Guard authorization or cross-chain causality.

Not claimed

  • Mainnet invoice_06 is one owner-funded settlement of about $25 that the agent authorized but did not pay. Its seven limits are listed with the receipts above.
  • No public audited vault. Guard does not custody swap assets; native NEAR used for storage and account operation is separate. An unrestricted origin key can bypass it.
  • No cryptographic atomic cross-chain causality for either the Tidepool testnet trade or the mainnet 1Click settlement.
  • Exact approved-program enforcement is still in open PR #202. A stored hash does not prove that enforcement.
  • No public scoped-vault refusal run, hostile-model mainnet run, independent audit or tagged release with build provenance is claimed by this snapshot.
  • Report vulnerabilities in private. Do not file exploits, keys, or seeds in a public issue. SECURITY.md